Industry
A US Army exercise shows how quickly units can adapt to the drone threat, and why the systems that equip them must learn to move at the same pace.

WRITTEN BY

James Langford
CATEGORY
Industry
READ TIME
3 min read
Exercises exist to expose weakness before an enemy does. Few have done so as clearly as Combined Resolve, held at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels in Germany this spring.
In an account published this month in Military Review, the US Army’s professional journal, the commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, and six of his officers describe what happened when their brigade faced an opposing force reinforced by drone operators from Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces. Over the ten day exercise, those operators made more than 750 drone contacts with the brigade, either striking directly or spotting targets for artillery. In the opening days, drones accounted for more than 70 per cent of the brigade’s simulated casualties.
By the third day, that share had fallen below 30 per cent.
What changed in three days
The improvement did not come from new equipment. It came from fieldcraft: overhead concealment, dispersion, smaller movement routes, reduced radio and satellite signatures, and immediate drills on detecting a drone. The brigade’s officers estimate these accounted for roughly 60 per cent of their effective counter drone protection. Their electronic warfare systems could protect an area once emplaced, but had to be moved in sequence as the brigade advanced, leaving vehicles exposed in between. Fibre optic drones, which do not rely on a radio link, were largely unaffected by jamming.
The cost of adapting
The adaptations carried costs. Reducing electronic signatures also reduced friendly tracking and communications. Resupply took twice as long as planned because logistics had to travel concealed and unpredictable routes. And when the brigade went on the offensive with more than 700 drones of its own, the volume of reconnaissance and strike data overwhelmed its processes for intelligence and airspace management, forcing commanders to delegate priorities further down.
Three lessons
Three lessons stand out for anyone building or buying defence technology.
Realistic testing is worth more than a specification sheet. A system that performs well in a static demonstration may behave very differently against a thinking opponent on the move. Ten days on a training area revealed gaps that no requirements document had captured.
The platform is rarely the whole answer. The decisive questions at Hohenfels concerned mobility of protection, signature management, data handling and logistics. Capability is the system around the drone, not the drone alone, and buyers who assess technology in isolation risk acquiring something that works perfectly and helps very little.
Units adapt faster than institutions. A brigade changed its behaviour in three days. Its own officers now propose new strike troops, new drone platoons and a shared operational picture. How quickly those proposals become fielded equipment depends not on the soldiers, but on the procurement and industrial systems behind them.
That is the deployment problem in its plainest form. The lessons are being learned at the speed of the threat. The question is whether the capability can be delivered at the same speed.
If you are building or buying counter drone technology and would like to talk, get in touch or apply via legatetechnologies.com.


